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I. INTRODUCTION

Imagine a normal American family experiencing a time of financial
difficulty, hypothetically named the Smiths. John and Jane, the parents, are
struggling to make ends meet after some unexpected medical expenses.1
The Smiths are trying to meet the demands of creditors while keeping food
on the table. One creditor has already received a judgment against the famI.

Medical expenses are the predominant precipitating factor in bankruptcy or financial

distress. MBPA: The Right Health Care Plan Can Help with Big Medical Bills for Business
Owners and their Families, PR NEWSWIRE, Michigan Business and Professional Association,
Feb. 17, 2005. The other precipitating factors are job loss and divorce or separation:
Among bankrupt families with children, 71.5 percent report a job loss, a
reduction of income, or other job-related problem as a reason for filing.
Fifty-three percent report a medical problem, which includes all filers
who reported $1,000 or more in unpaid medical bills, who had at least
two weeks of unpaid leave from work because of an illness or disability,
or who explained that they filed for bankruptcy because of a medical
problem. Family breakup, cited by 19 percent of families with children,
includes those who reported divorce or family breakup as a cause of
bankruptcy. Families with children cite at least one of these problems in
86.9 percent of all cases. The remaining 13.1 percent give either a different reason or no reason at all.
ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE Two-INCOME TRAP: WHY MIDDLE
CLASS MOTHERS AND FATHERS ARE GOING BROKE 215 n.31 (2003).
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ily and has recently garnished a significant portion of John's wages and the
family's bank account. Prior to receiving the notice of garnishment, John's
employer automatically deposited John's last paycheck in the family's bank
account. John has asked the court to protect this portion of his wages under
his state's exemption statute. The court must now decide whether the wages
maintain their exempt status after being deposited into the bank account.
Although the previous paragraph portrays a fictional situation, such
facts may be all too familiar to those who have had their wages garnished.
Throughout this comment, the hypothetical Smith family will be revisited to
illustrate different aspects of wage garnishment exemption statutes and the
effect of varying case law.
Exemption statutes exist to protect a portion of a debtor's wages and
have the general purpose of preventing personal bankruptcy, allowing a head
of household to provide for his or her family and meet basic needs, therefore
preventing reliance on government welfare resources.2 Surely an exemption
that preserves a percentage of personal wages should be recognized even
after the wages have been deposited into the bank, otherwise, where is the
exemption?3
Wyoming's wage garnishment exemption statute provides an exemption for seventy-five percent of a person's disposable earnings.4 But
according to a recent ruling by the Wyoming Supreme Court, the exemption
applies only to wages that are "accrued" or "payable. 5 The statute at issue
states in portion: "A writ of post judgment garnishment attaching earnings
for personal services shall attach that portion of the defendant's accrued and
unpaid disposable earnings....
As a result, wages that already have been
2.
Kozkoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650 (1974).
3.
Matthews v. Lewis, 617 S.W.2d 43, 45 (Ky. 198 1).
4.
See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-15-408 (2005).
5.
In re Walsh, 96 P.3d 1, 3 (Wyo. 2004).
6.
WYO. STAT. ANN. §1-15-408(a) (2005) (emphasis added). The entire subsection of
the statute reads as follows:
(a) A writ of post judgment garnishment attaching earnings for personal
services shall attach that portion of the defendant's accrued and unpaid
disposable earnings, specified in subsection (b) of this section. The writ
shall direct the garnishee to withhold from the defendant's accrued disposable earnings the amount attached pursuant to the writ and to pay the
exempted amount to the defendant at the time his earnings are normally
paid. Earnings for personal services shall be deemed to accrue on the last
day of the period in which they were earned or to which they relate. If the
writ is served before or on the date the defendant's earnings accrue and
before the same have been paid to the defendant, the writ shall be deemed
to have been served at the time the periodic earnings accrue. If more than
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol6/iss1/3
one (I) writ is served, the writ first served shall have priority. Notwithstanding any other provision of this subsection, an income withholding
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paid and deposited or paid and held as cash are no longer exempt and must
be surrendered to creditors. Although most state wage exemption statutes
are modeled after the same federal statute and contain similar language, judicial interpretation of such statutes varies widely.7
This comment provides an overview of the history of wage garnishment exemptions, reviews significant judicial decisions from around the
country, and examines a number of state wage garnishment exemptions statutes. This comment suggests that the Wyoming Legislature should enact a
new wage garnishment exemption statute that expressly provides for exempt
wages to survive deposit into a bank.8
II. BACKGROUND

How does a person find himself or herself with wages being garnished? Like the Smiths in the introductory hypothetical, unexpected or
spiraling medical expenses are the most probable cause today.' Job-loss or
reductions in job pay and divorce or separation are the other most common
causes of financial distress.'0 Financial distress alone, however, does not
lead to garnishment. Garnishment procedures are available to assist a creditor in
the collection of debts and require a court judgment to establish liabilI
ity.
Exemption statutes protect debtors by preventing the seizure of certain property under a writ of execution or a writ of garnishment. 2 General
exemption statutes exist in all fifty states and come in many different varie-

order for child support obtained pursuant to W.S. 20-6-201 through
20-6-222 shall have priority over any other garnishment.
Id. (emphasis added).
7.
See generally 14 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY (15th ed. rev. 2004) (providing a discussion on all state exemption statutes).
8.
For an example of a wage garnishment exemption statute that specifically provides an
exemption of deposited wages, see MINN. STAT. § 550.37(13) (2004).
9.
See supra note I.
10.
See supra note I.
11.
See LYNN M. LoPucri & ELIZABETH WARREN, SECURED CREDIT: A SYSTEMS
APPROACH 4 (4th ed. 2003), see infra note 12 and accompanying text for additional information on garnishment.
12.
See LOPUCrK & WARREN, supra note 11, at 15. A "writ" is a court's written order, in
the name of a state or other competent legal authority, commanding the addressee to do or
refrain from doing some specified act. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1640 (8th ed. 2004).
"Execution" in this context is a judicial enforcement of a money judgment. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 609 (8th ed. 2004). Garnishment is an independent action against a third party
who
money of
to Wyoming
the judgment
debtor. 2006
DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN 3
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ties.' 3 Homestead exemptions allow a debtor to protect a portion of a
home's value. 4 Vehicle exemptions allow a debtor to keep a vehicle or a
portion of a vehicle's proceeds from sale, depending on value.'" There are
exemptions for tools of a trade or business and exemptions that allow a person to keep a burial plot.16
The first exemption statutes are centuries old and are "rooted in
early English Common Law."' 7 For example, Delaware's first exemption
statutes existed before this country's revolutionary war, and many other
states adopted exemption statutes by the mid to late 1800s.' 8 Wyoming enacted a statutory exemption in 1899.'9

13.
See generally COLLIER, supra note 7 and Appendix A (providing a discussion on all
state exemption statutes. Indiana, New Jersey, North Dakota, and Rhode Island do not have
exemption statutes that specifically apply to wages). Id.
14.
WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-20-101 (2005) exempts a homestead not exceeding $10,000 in
value.
15.
WYo. STAT. ANN. § i-20-106(a)(iv) (2005) exempts a motor vehicle not exceeding
$2,400 in value.
16.
See WYO.STAT. ANN. § 1-20-106(b) (2005) and § 1-20-106(a)(ii) (2005) respectively,
which provide a $2,000 exemption for tools of trade or professional books or instruments and
a lot in a cemetery or burial ground.
17.
Stratton v. Travis, 380 A.2d 985, 986-87 (Del. Super. Ct. 1977).
18.
Stratton, 380 A.2d at 986-87 (noting that Delaware's first general exemption statute
exempted clothing, bedding, and tools, and has been replaced several times). See DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 10, § 4903 (2004) for a current version of the statute. See, e.g., In re Buchberger,
311 B.R. 794 n.4 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2004) (noting that Arizona's first exemption statute was
adopted in 1913); In re Norris 203 B.R. 463, 466 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1996) (noting that Nevada's first enacted exemption statute was in 1911); In re Neal 140 B.R. 634, 637 (Bankr.
W.D. Tex. 1992) (informing that Texas' first exemption statute dates from 1839); MacDonald
v. Mercill, 714 P.2d 132, 134 (Mont. 1986) (stating that Montana's exemption statute dates
from 1895); In re Marriage of Logston, 469 N.E.2d 167, 172 (I1. 1984) (noting that Illinois'
first exemption statute existed in 1843); First Nat. Bank of Mobile v. Pope, 149 So. 2d 781,
787 (Ala. 1963) (comparing Alabama statute to New York's first exemption statute in 1840).
19.
Wyoming's first exemption statute was codified at section 3951 of 1899 REVISED
STATUTES OF WYOMING and stated:
The judge may order any property of the judgment debtor, or money due
him, not exempt by law, in the hands of either himself or other [sic] person, or of a corporation, to be applied toward the satisfaction of a judgment; but one-half of the earnings of the judgment debtor for his personal
services, rendered at any time within sixty days next preceding the levy of
execution or levy of attachment, and due and owing at the time of such
levy of execution or attachment, are exempt when it appears by the
debtor's affidavit, or otherwise, that such earnings are necessary for the
use of his family residing in this state, supported wholly or in part by his
labors; there shall be exempt in all cases a sum not to exceed fifty dollars.
REv. STAT. WYO. § 3951 (1899). Wyoming's statutory compilation which preceded the 1899
version, 1887 REVISED STATUTES OF WYOMING, did not contain a wage exemption as above,
but did contain exemptions for a homestead (not exceeding $1,500), an exemption for wearhttps://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol6/iss1/3
ing apparel (not exceeding $150), a head of family exemption which includes, first: the family
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Exemption statutes have multiple applications including debtorcreditor law,2" taxation,2 and wills and estates.22 Exemption statutes also

apply to bankruptcy proceedings by allowing a bankruptcy petitioner
to exempt or remove property from the bankruptcy estate. 23 Wage garnishment exemption statutes apply both in bankruptcy and in debtor-creditor
law. Such statutes are recognized in debtor-creditor law as a tool "[to] al-

low debtor[s] to retain a portion of their personal property free from
seizure and sale by their creditors under judicial process." 24 To fully
understand wage garnishment exemption statutes it is necessary to understand the background, history, and public policy of statutory wage exemptions. In addition, examination of the Consumer Credit Protection Act
(CCPA) which serves as the model for most state exemption statutes is also
essential. 25 The section that follows provides an overview of the policies
that support the adoption of wage exemption statutes.
A. The Public Policy of Wage GarnishmentExemption Statutes
There are many identifiable benefits that support a wage garnishment exemption. Courts have recognized at least five specific purposes,
including:
1. To provide a debtor enough money to survive.
2. To protect his dignity and his cultural and religious identity.
3. To afford a means of financial rehabilitation.
4. To protect the family unit from impoverishment.

bible, pictures, school books; second: a cemetery lot or burial ground; and third: furniture,
bedding, provisions and such ... not to exceed $500. REV. STAT. WYO. §§ 2780-2788 (1887).
There also existed an exemption for tools of trade not exceeding $300 and a peculiar exemption directed at municipalities protecting fire protection equipment from execution. REv.
STAT. WYO. §§ 2790, 2791 (1887).
20.
LoPucKI & WARREN, supra note 11, at 15.
21.
I.R.C. §§ 1031-41 (2000). Internal Revenue Code, Chapter 1, Subchapter 0, part III
lists common nontaxable exchanges such as like-kind exchanges and transfers between
spouses incident to divorce.
22.
Unif. Probate Code § 2-402 (amended 2003) (providing for a $15,000 exemption/homestead allowance); Unif. Probate Code § 2-403 (amended 2003) (providing for a
$10,000 personal property allowance).
23.
In re Thompson, 867 F.2d 416, 418 (7th Cir. 1989). Bankruptcy estate is defined as a
debtor's legal and equitable interests in property at the beginning of a bankruptcy case where
the property is subject to administration. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 157 (8th ed. 2004).
24.
In re Komet, 104 B.R. 799, 806 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989).
25.
Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1700 (2000). See generally
Published
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5. To spread the burden of the debtor's support from society to his
creditors.2 6
Perhaps the most apparent purpose of wage exemption statutes is to
preserve some portion of the debtor's wages so the debtor can provide for
his or her family and "not become a public charge."27 In addition, the United
States Supreme Court stated in Kokoszka v. Belford that exemptions serve in
the "prevention of bankruptcy ... by eliminating an essential element in the
predatory extension of credit resulting in a disruption of employment....""
The Kokoszka Court stated that the legislative history of the CCPA indicated
that Congress intended to regulate garnishment "in an effort to avoid the
necessity of bankruptcy .. .[and preserve some] compensation needed to
support the wage earner and his family on a week-to-week, month-to-month
basis."29
Exemption statutes permit the orderly payment of consumer debts.30
Instead of filing bankruptcy and discharging the debt without payment, a
debtor taking advantage of the exemption statutes retains a portion of his or
her earnings for family and contributes to paying off the debt through the
portion of the wages that are attached by garnishment.3 1 In addition, wage
garnishment exemption statutes prevent an employer from firing an employee.32 Such laws provide for the orderly payment of debt since the debtor
will not lose his or her job because of one unpaid debt and will be able to
continue to pay the debt in small amounts. 33
Possibly the predominant purpose of exemptions is that they exist to
allow a debtor to preserve some portion of his or her property in order to

26.
In re Hahn, 5 B.R. 242, 244 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1980).
27.
In re Whalen, 73 B.R. 986, 988-89 (C.D. I11.
1987); Holmes v. Blazer Fin. Serv., Inc.,
369 So. 2d 987, 990 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (quoting Wolf v. Commander, 188 So. 83, 84
(Fla. 1939)).
28.
Kokoszka v. Belford 417 U.S. 642, 651 (1974). Wage exemption statutes prevent the
predatory extension of credit because the exemption makes recovery by the creditor more
difficult. See infra note 44, discussing garnishment as a tool for recovery. When recovery is
more difficult, a creditor is more likely to carefully decide who will receive credit based on
ability to repay without default, instead of relying on the default remedy of garnishment to
recover the debt. Id.
29.
Id. at 651.
30.
Brown v. Kentucky, 40 S.W.3d 873, 877 (Ky. Ct. App. 1999).
31.
Id.
32.
See infra note 51 and accompanying text for the relevant portion of the CCPA statute
and discussion of the illegality and consequences of discharging an employee subject to wage
garnishment.
33.
See Employment Law Guide, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Policy, U.S. Department of Labor, at http://www.dol.gov/asp/programs/guide/garnish.htm (last visited Nohttps://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol6/iss1/3
vember 28, 2005).
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provide for a family.34 This public policy has been stated eloquently in
many cases. One Florida Court wrote:
The purpose of the [wage exemption statute] is to protect
citizens against financial reverses and difficulties and to
permit the... head of a family to be secure in money coming to him for his labor and services thereby supporting his
family and preventing it from becoming a public charge.35
The Supreme Court of Kentucky found its state exemption statutes
"are simply another necessary instrument in the overall scheme of social
welfare programs., 36 Nevada's wage garnishment exemption statute was
found "to protect a debtor by permitting him to retain the basic necessities of
life so that after the levy of nonexempt property he and his family will not be
left destitute. 3 7 The Kentucky Court of Appeals summed up the policy of
exemptions by stating that exemptions serve for "the prevention of bankruptcy, ... the continued orderly payment of consumer debts, . . . [to preserve] compensation needed to support the wage earner and his family...
and prevent creditors from unduly burdening the employment relationship."3 These same policy considerations prompted Congress to adopt the
CCPA, discussed below.
B. History of the Consumer CreditProtectionAct
In 1968, Congress enacted the CCPA.3 9 Its general purpose is "to
protect consumers from unfair, illegal, and deceptive acts or practices by
providing an avenue of relief for consumers who would otherwise have difficulty proving their case under a more traditional cause of action.' '4O The
Congressional findings relating to the CCPA state:
(1) The unrestricted garnishment of compensation due for
personal services encourages the making of predatory extensions of credit. Such extensions of credit divert money into
excessive credit payments and thereby hinder the production
and flow of goods in interstate commerce.

34.
See infra notes 35, 37, 38 and accompanying text for a discussion of exemptions
allowing family financial stability.
35.
Wolf v. Commander, 188 So. 83, 84 (Fla. 1939).
36.
Matthews v. Lewis, 617 S.W.2d 43, 44 (Ky. 1981) (regarding exemption for worker's
compensation funds deposited into a bank account).
37.
In re Norris, 203 B.R. 463, 465-66 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1996).
38.
Brown v. Kentucky, 40 S.W.3d 873, 876-77 (Ky. Ct. App. 1999).
39.
Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1700 (2000); In re Lawrence,
205 B.R. 115, 117 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1997).
Published40.
by Law
Archive
of Wyoming
2006Pontiac-Buick, Inc., 461 S.E.2d 516, 7
State
ex rel.
McGraw v.Scholarship,
Scott Runyan
523 (W.Va. 1995).

WYOMING LAW REVIEW

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 6 [2006], No. 1, Art. 3

Vol. 6

(2) The application of garnishment as a creditors' remedy
frequently results in loss of employment by the debtor, and
the resulting disruption of employment, production, and
consumption constitutes a substantial burden on interstate
commerce.
(3) The great disparities among the laws of the several
States relating to garnishment have, in effect, destroyed the
uniformity of the bankruptcy laws and frustrated the purposes thereof in many areas of the country.4
Prior to the passage of the CCPA, lenders were predatory in their extension of credit, which may have played a substantial role in large increases
in consumer debt as well as consumer bankruptcies.4 2 At that time, creditors
could be aggressive in their lending because the law did not restrict or limit
one powerful tool of recovery, namely garnishment.43 The garnishing of
wages is an effective tool for recovery because it creates leverage and imposes a great hardship on the debtor and his or her family." As a result of
the hardship, a debtor who is subject to a wage garnishment has only two
choices, either pay the debt or file for bankruptcy.45 It also was common for
a debtor subject to wage garnishment to consequently lose his or her job
through termination by the employer.46

41.

15 U.S.C. § 1671 (2000).

42.
See id. See also Kozkozka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650 (1974). As one commentator observed, prior to passing the CCPA:
Total consumer credit, as Congress discovered, increased from
$7,222,000,000 in 1939 to over $95,000,000,000 by 1967. ... Congress
expressed particular concern over the filing of an ever-increasing number
of personal bankruptcies by individuals unable to cope with their debts
when confronted by harsh state garnishment laws, as well as concern over
the discharge of employees which occurred when garnishment actions
were initiated by creditors. As the House Report for this Act disclosed,
personal bankruptcy declarations rose from 18,000 per year in 1950 to
over 208,000 per year by 1967.
Annotation, Validity, Construction and Application of§§301-307 of Consumer Credit Protection Act (15 US.C.A. §§1671-1677) Placing Restrictions on Garnishment of Individual's
Earnings, 14 A.L.R. Fed. 447 §(2)(a) (2005).
43.
See 15 U.S.C. §1674 (2000) for CCPA statutory language precluding an employer
from discharging an employee as a result of a garnishment action on the employee's wages.
44.
LAYCOCK, supra note 12, at 865. Garnishing wages is very effective against debtors
because it creates hardship. Id. Congress responded to that hardship in the CCPA by limiting
wage garnishment. Id.
45.
Id.
46.
See 15 U.S.C. §1671 (2000); In re Willet, 265 F. Supp. 999, 1001 (S.D. Ca. 1967);
Wallace v. Debron Corp., 494 F.2d 674, 676-77 (8th Cir. 1974). The Wallace court presented
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol6/iss1/3
reasons that a company might discharge an employee with more than one garnishment:
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Prior to the enactment of the CCPA, John and Jane Smith, our hypothetical family, would find themselves in a very difficult situation. A creditor would be able to garnish an unlimited proportion of both John and Jane's
wages.47 In addition, either John or Jane could lose their job as a result of
one garnishment action, leaving the Smith family with nothing to provide for
their needs.48
Congress remedied each of these problems with specific provisions
of the CCPA.4 9 First, 15 U.S.C. §1673 restricts garnishment and provides as
follows:
(a) Maximum allowable garnishment
[TIhe maximum part of the aggregate disposable earnings of
an individual for any workweek which is subjected to garnishment may not exceed
(1) 25 per centum of his disposable earningsfor that
week, or
(2) the amount by which his disposable earningsfor
that week exceed thirty times the Federal minimum
hourly wage.. . whichever is less. °
Second, §1674 addresses the loss of employment:
(a) Termination of employment. No employer may discharge any employee by reason of the fact that his earnings
have been subjected to garnishment for any one indebted5
ness. 1

[T]he capability, enthusiasm, efficiency, and quality of performance, of
any employee whose wages are garnished more than once in a twelvemonth period noticeably decrease on account of his wages being partially
withheld for the benefit of his creditors; at the same time, there is an increase in expense, inconvenience, and annoyance to [the employer].
Wallace, 494 F.2d at 676.
47.
15 U.S.C. §1671(a)(1) (2000).
48.
15 U.S.C. §1671(a)(2) (2000).
49.
See 15 U.S.C. §1673 (2000); 15 U.S.C. §1674 (2000).

50.

15 U.S.C. § 1673(a) (2000) (emphasis added).

51.
15 U.S.C. § 1674 (2000) (emphasis added) (omitting (b) which provides for criminal
punishment of a fine of not more than.$1,000 and imprisonment not more than one year, or
both for a violation of (a)). Note also that section 1674 only prohibits termination as a result
Publishedofby
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These statutes restrict the amount of wages a creditor may garnish to
only twenty-five percent of a debtor's disposable earnings or the amount by
which disposable earnings for the week exceed thirty times the federal
minimum wage rate. 2 The CCPA also makes it illegal to discharge an employee just because his or her wages have been garnished one time." Language nearly identical to CCPA § 1673 can be found in a large number of
state wage exemption statutes.54 Compare, for example, Wyoming's wage
garnishment exemption statute:
§ 1-15-408 Garnishment of earnings for personal services.

(b) The maximum portion of the aggregate disposable earnings of an individual which are subject to garnishment is the
lesser of:
(i) Twenty-five percent (25%) of defendant's disposable
earningsfor that week; or...
(ii) The amount by which defendant's aggregate disposable earnings computed for that week exceeds
thirty (30) times the federal minimum hourly wage
55

After comparing the two statutes it should be clear that the CCPA
was a model for Wyoming's wage garnishment exemption statute. The
CCPA is also a model for many state wage exemption statutes around the
country. 6
One portion of the CCPA that deserves attention is § 1677, which
states in relevant part:
This subchapter does not annul, alter, or affect, or exempt
any person from complying with, the laws of any State
52.
Disposable earnings are defined as "that part of the earnings of any individual remaining after the deduction from those earnings of any amounts required by law to be withheld."
15. U.S.C. § 1672(b) (2000).
53.
15 U.S.C. §1673 (2000); 15 U.S.C. §1674 (2000). In 1970, Supreme Court Justice
William 0. Douglas estimated that over 250,000 employees lose employment as a result of
wage garnishment to satisfy indebtedness.

WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, POINTS OF REBELLION 48

(1970).
54.
15 U.S.C. § 1673 (2000); see generally COLLIER, supra note 7 and Appendix A
(thirty-four states have wage exemption statutes which exempt twenty-five percent of the
wage or thirty times the federal minimum wage, or some similar percentage and wage factor).

55.
Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 1-15-408 (2005) (emphasis added).
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol6/iss1/3
56.

See generally COLLIER, supra note 7 and Appendix A.
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(1) prohibiting garnishments or providing for more limited
garnishment than are allowed under this subchapter ....
This portion of the statute allows states to "opt out" of the federal exemption
statutes and enact exemption statutes that provide more debtor protection
than the federal CCPA.5 In other words, the CCPA establishes a floor of
protection for wage garnishment. 9 For a court to find that the state statute
provides additional protection to garnished wages, the state must have modified the statute or shown some legislative intent for an extension of coverage, or some history or tradition of allowing the exemption.'
C. JudicialInterpretationof CCPA and State Wage GarnishmentExemption
Statutes
1. Judicial Interpretation of CCPA Wage Garnishment Exemption
Statutes
Most courts considering the issue have determined the CCPA exemption does not apply to wages deposited into bank accounts or removed
from third party employer's control. 6' These courts, however, also recognize

57.

15 U.S.C. § 1677 (2000).

58.
In re Osworth, 234 B.R. 497, 499 (9th Cir. 1999) (interpreting the CCPA as allowing
states to grant debtors greater protection from garnishment than they receive under the
CCPA).
59.
Brown v. Kentucky, 40 S.W.3d 873, 877 (Ky. Ct. App. 1999). Commentators have
noted:
This Act does not pre-empt the field of garnishment entirely, but provides
that in those instances where state and federal laws are inconsistent, then
the courts are to apply the law which garnishes the lesser amount, or
which provides for the greater restriction on an employer's right to discharge an employee whose wages have been garnished. By providing for
this choice between state and federal law, Congress obviously intended to
maximize the protection available to the debtor. Thus, a state garnishment
statute is not necessarily invalid merely because it is more favorable to
the creditor in one respect, if it contains other sections more favorable to
the debtor.
Annotation, Validity, Construction and Application of§§301-307 of Consumer Credit Protection Act (15 U.S.C.A. §§1671-1677) Placing Restrictions on Garnishment of Individual's
Earnings,14 A.L.R. FED. 447 §(2)(a) (2005).
60.
See Brown, 40 S.W.3d at 878; In re Urban, 262 B.R. 865, 867 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2001).
See infra notes 63, 64 and accompanying text for discussion of the "Brown analysis".
See, e.g., Brown, 40 S.W.3d at 877 (Ky. Ct. App. 1999); In re Lawrence, 205 B.R.
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level of
debtor protection. 62 In Brown
to provide
a higher
states arethe
free
that
v. Kentucky,
Kentucky
Court
of Appeals
stated:
[V]irtually all of the courts to consider whether the [CCPA]
applies to wages deposited into bank accounts or otherwise
removed from the employer's control have found that it
does not. The CCPA, however, establishes only a floor of
debtor protection; states are free under the act to impose
their own more rigorous restrictions on garnishment."
The Brown court looked to the state's legislative history to determine whether there was an intention to extend the protections of the CCPA
modeled statute to wages that have been paid and deposited into a bank account.' Although the Brown court held that Kentucky's exemption statute
does not apply to deposited funds, the court provided an analysis for interpretation of state wage garnishment exemption statutes modeled after the
CCPA: To find an exemption for deposited wages the court must determine
whether the state legislature modified the language of the federal statute and
determine if there was legislative intent to provide protection beyond that of
the CCPA.65
Brown is just one example of state treatment of exemption statutes,
and such state treatment varies widely.' Not all state exemption statutes are
modeled after the CCPA and consequently, not all state exemption statutes
are subject to the Brown analysis.67 But courts interpreting state wage garnishment exemption statutes, which are modeled after the CCPA, have
treated them in one of two ways. Some state courts have held consistent
with CCPA rulings that the exemption protects only wages that are accrued
and payable (not deposited)." Other states have held that extra protection

62.
See, e.g., Brown, 40 S.W.3d at 877 (Ky. Ct. App. 1999); John 0. Melby & Co. Bank
v. Anderson, 276 N.W. 2d 274, 279 (Wis. 1979). See supra note 58, 59 and accompanying
text for discussion on the minimum level of protection provided by the CCPA.
63.
Brown, 40 S.W.3d at 877.
64.
Id. at 877-79.
65.
Id. at 878 (this analysis may be referred to hereinafter as the "Brown analysis" meaning look to the state statute and determine if the legislature intended to extend protection
beyond CCPA).
66.
See infra notes 68, 69.
67.
See generally COLLIER, supra note 7 and Appendix A for a discussion of all state
exemption statutes.
68.
See, e.g., Brown, 40 S.W.3d 873, 878-79 (Ky. Ct. App. 1999); John 0. Melby & Co.
Bank v. Anderson, 276 N.W.2d 274, 277, 279 (Wis. 1979); Holmes v. Blazer Fin. Serv., Inc.,
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol6/iss1/3
369 So. 2d 987, 990 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Hertz v. Fisher, 339 So. 2d 1148, 1149 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1976), for cases holding there is no exemption for deposited wages.
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should be afforded to debtors, and that wages, although paid and deposited,
should be protected. 9
2. Judicial Interpretation of State Wage Garnishment Exemption
Statutes Modeled After the CCPA
A recent ruling, In re Walsh, caused the current problem in Wyoming.7" On August 23, 2004, the Supreme Court of Wyoming ruled that
wages that had been deposited into the bank were no longer exempt funds
and therefore subject to garnishment. 7' The Walshes filed bankruptcy on
April 29, 2003, and on the very same day a judgment creditor garnished the
contents of their bank account that consisted of $2,541.18, all of which was
from Mr. Walsh's previous paycheck." The court examined the words of
Wyoming's wage garnishment statute focusing on "accrued" and "unpaid"
and concluded that the Walshes' wages were neither accrued nor unpaid, but
instead paid.7 Consequently, the wages deposited in the bank were not exempt under either the state's wage garnishment exemption statute or the
CCPA."4 The problem this decision created in Wyoming is that a debtor,
such as John Smith, would have wages protected from garnishment as long
as the wages have not been paid, but as soon as the wages are paid and/or
deposited, the wages lose their identity as exempt funds.
Not all courts agree with Wyoming's interpretation of CCPA modeled statutes. Courts in Kansas, Nevada, Missouri, Colorado, and Iowa have
come to much different conclusions when interpreting such statutes. 75 For
example, in In re Kobernusz, a bankruptcy court case from Colorado, the
court allowed an exemption for deposited funds. 76 The Kobernusz case concerned a debtor claiming that funds in a personal bank account were exempt
under the Colorado wage exemption statute because the funds were deposited wages.77 The Kobernusz court followed a Colorado Supreme Court case
from 1891, Rutter v. Shumway, and exempted wages after deposit.7
The
Rutter decision was over one hundred years old at the time and showed
69.
See, e.g., In re Platt, 270 B.R. 773, 776 (Bankr. D. Ore. 2001); In re Urban, 262 B.R.
865, 870 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2001); In re Kobernusz, 160 B.R. 844, 848 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1993);
In re Norris, 203 B.R. 463, 468 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1996); Midamerica Say. Bank v. Miehe, 438
N.W.2d. 837, 839-40 (Iowa 1989) for cases allowing an exemption for deposited wages.
70.
In re Walsh, 96 P.3d I (Wyo. 2004).
71.
Id. at 1.

72.

Id. at2.

73.

Id.

74.
75.

Id. at 1, 3.
See In re Urban, 262 B.R. 865, 870 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2001); In re Norris, 203 B.R.

463, 468 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1996); In re Arnold, 193 B.R. 897, 900 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1996); In
re Kobernusz, 160 B.R. 844, 848 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1993); Midamerica Say. Bank v. Miehe,
438 N.W.2d. 837, 839-40 (Iowa 1989).
76.
In re Kobernusz, 160 B.R. 844, 848 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1993).
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Colorado's long history and preference for allowing the identity of a wage
exemption to survive despite wages being deposited into a bank account.79
As a whole, Colorado's statute is similar to Wyoming's and is modeled after
the CCPA statute, granting exemption for seventy-five percent of disposable
earnings or thirty times the federal minimum wage rate, whichever is less.8°
Under the Colorado statute and case law, John and Jane Smith would be able
to protect seventy-five percent of the wages they deposited in the bank.
In In re Norris, a bankruptcy court case from Nevada, the court addressed the application of state exemption statutes. 8' In Norris, the party
filed bankruptcy, and on the date of filing the debtor's wages were deposited
directly into a personal bank account.82 The debtor claimed these funds were
exempt wages under Nevada's exemption statute, another CCPA modeled
statute.8 3 Although the Nevada Supreme Court had never ruled on this specific issue, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Nevada found the
deposited wages could be readily traceable, and the historical purpose of
exemptions was to protect a debtor's need for basic necessities of life. 4 The
Norris court held that the exemption statute would be rendered meaningless
79.

Rutter, 26 P. at 322. The Rutter court stated in relevant portion:
So long as the wages or earnings of the debtor are capable of identification he is entitled to have them exempt, according to the terms and provisions of the statute. It is argued with much ingenuity that the earnings of
the laborer, when received by him, are no longer wages, but capital; that
the exemption statute has performed its office when it has enabled the laborer to secure his wages from his employer without let or hindrance; and
that thereafter the statute cannot be invoked in his favor. The statute cannot be thus reasoned away. Such a construction is narrow and illiberal.

Id.

80.
Compare COL. REv. STAT. §13-54-104(l)(b)(1)(A) (2005), with Wyo. STAT. ANN. §l15-408(a) (2005).
81.
In re Norris, 203 B.R. 463, 464 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1996).
82.
Id. at 464.
83.
Id. See generally COLLIER, supra note 7 and Appendix A for a discussion of all state
exemption statutes.
84.
Norris, 203 B.R. at 465-66. The term "traceable" in this context is related to tracing,
or the process of tracking property's ownership or characteristics from the time of its origin to
the present.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

1529 (8th ed. 2004). There are different forms and

methods of tracing for dealing with a deposit type account. LoPucKI & WARREN, supra note
I1, at 176. One is the lowest intermediate balance rule which "provides that the amount of
the secured creditor's collateral remaining in a bank account is equal to the lowest balance of
all funds in the account between the time the collateral was deposited to the account and the
time the rule is applied." Id. One could also use accounting methods for tracing such as firstin-first-out (FIFO), as used in the Minnesota statute which expressly requires FIFO as the
appropriate tracing method for wage exemption after deposit into a bank account. MINN.
STAT § 550.37(13) (LexisNexis 2004). FIFO is an accounting term where the asset, or money
in this situation, is treated as leaving the account in the same order in which the money arhttps://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol6/iss1/3
rived. See JAY ALIX, ROBERT J ROCK & TED STENGER, FINANCIAL HANDBOOK FOR
BANKRUPTCY PROFESSIONALS § 9.12(a) (2d ed. 1996).
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unless the debtor at least had the chance to deposit and spend the wages."
The Norris court referred to two United States Supreme Court cases, Porter
v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. and Philpott v. Essex County Welfare
Board.86 These cases recognized that "exempt funds do not lose their exempt status upon deposit if the funds in the account can be traced to exempt
funds."87 Although these two United States Supreme Court cases did not
directly address the status of a wage garnishment exemption, they did deal
with other statutory exemptions and many lower courts have relied on their
precedent in the wage exemption context.88 Like Colorado, under the Nevada statute interpreted in Norris, the Smiths would be able to protect seventy-five percent of their previously deposited wages.89
Another bankruptcy court in In re Urban held that wages are protected by Kansas' CCPA modeled exemption, even if deposited, "until the
earnings are commingled or become untraceable."9 In so holding, the court
rejected an analysis similar to the majority in Walsh. Instead the court considered the legislative history concerning the Kansas statute, which is comparable to Wyoming's, and ruled in favor of allowing the exemption after
deposit. It is noteworthy that the Urban court allowed the exemption for
deposited wages that are traceable, and the state exemption statute language
is similar to Wyoming.9 ' If the Smiths lived in Kansas, a significant portion
of John's deposited wages would be protected from garnishment because the
Kansas statute has been interpreted to protect traceable, deposited wages.
The Iowa Supreme Court also has held that exempt wages continue
to be exempt after deposit into an account as long as those funds can be
traced to exempt wages.92 The court relied on a 1930 Iowa case, Staton v.
Vernon, which illustrated Iowa's history of allowing the exemption, and
stated:
[Ilt would be an unreasonable construction to hold that by
the deposit of the earnings in the bank the debtor had voluntarily parted with the money and had acquired, in lieu
85.
Norris, 203 B.R. at 466.
86.
Id. at 467 (citing Porter v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 370 U.S. 159 (1962) (regarding
exempt status of veterans' benefits)); Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Bd., 409 U.S. 413
(1973) (regarding exempt status of welfare benefits).
87.
Norris, 203 B.R. at 467.
88.
For lower court cases discussing United State Supreme Court cases Porter and Philpott see In re Lawrence, 205 B.R. 115 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1997), aff'd 219 B.R. 786, 792
(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1998). See also In re Norris, 203 B.R. 463, 467 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1996).
89.
Norris, 203 B.R. at 463.
90.
In re Urban, 262 B.R. 865, 870 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2001) (examining state exemption
statute, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-23 10 (LexisNexis 2003)).
91.
Id. Compare KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2310 (LexisNexis 2003), with WYo. STAT. ANN.
Published§by
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92.
Midamerica Sav. Bank v. Miehe, 438 N.W.2d 837, 839 (Iowa 1989).
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thereof, a credit due to him from the bank and, therefore, the
exempt character of the money had been lost.93
In addition, the court found the rationale and policy of Staton was
still applicable, even though the statute had undergone substantial changes
since 1930.'4 Iowa's exemption statute expressly grants protection under the
CCPA statute, but also provides for statutory maximum garnishments based
on an income scale. 95 In Iowa, John and Jane Smith would be able to protect
most of the deposited wages in their bank account as long as they could trace
the funds to a paycheck for personal service earnings.
Similarly, the court in In re Platt held that a debtor may exempt
wages that have been deposited, so long as the wages are traceable.96 Oregon's wage exemption statute is similar to the CCPA, but in this case, the
decision was made fairly easy by an additional statute instructing that exempt funds must be traceable to remain exempt. 97
Missouri has enacted an exemption statute comparable to Wyoming.
The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Missouri, in In re
Arnold, interpreted the Missouri statute to allow the exemption to survive
deposit into a bank account.9 8 The court stated that "[it] elevates form over
substance to claim that the check in [the debtor's] hand was wages, but the
check in his checking account was not." 99 The rationale of Arnold is that the
actual form of the wages should not be determinative, as long as the funds
can be traced to wages."
The previous cases are evidence that courts construing exemption
statutes modeled after the CCPA may interpret such legislation to provide
protection for wages that have been deposited.

93.
Staton v. Vernon, 229 N.W.2d 763, 764 (Iowa 1930) (emphasis added).
94.
Miehe, 438 N.W.2d at 839. The old version of the statute stated: "The earnings of a
debtor, who is a resident of the state and the head of a family, for his personal services, or
those of his family, at any time within ninety days next preceding the levy, are exempt from
liability for debt." IOWA CODE § 11763 (1927). Iowa Code section 11763 was repealed in
1954; the subsequent statute was replaced in 1971 with the current statute, Iowa Code section
642.21, which provides for a graduated scale of exemption which provides greater protection
for lower earnings. IOWA CODE § 642.21 (LexisNexis 2004).
95.
IOWA CODE § 642.21 (LexisNexis 2004).
96.
In re Platt, 270 B.R. 773, 775 (Bankr. D. Ore. 2001).
97.
Id. (citing to OR. REV. STAT. § 23.166(1) (LexisNexis 2002) which was renumbered
to § 18.348 in 2003). See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 18.385, 18.348 (LexisNexis 2003) for Oregon's
current wage exemption statute.
98.
In re Arnold, 193 B.R. 897, 900 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1996).
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol6/iss1/3
99.
Id.
100. See id.
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III. ANALYSIS
There are several questions that this comment will answer. What is
wrong with Wyoming's wage garnishment exemptions statute? What can be
done to fix Wyoming's wage garnishment exemption statute? What have
other states done to remedy the same problem?
A. Wyoming's Problem.- In re Walsh
Wyoming's current problem regarding the state's wage garnishment
exemption statute was caused by the Walsh decision in 2004."0 As a result
of Walsh, exempt funds lose their exempt status simply by the act of depositing the funds into the bank, as exemplified in this comment by the hypothetical Smith family.10 2 In specific situations, such as with John Smith, the
result is an exemption statute that provides no protection since only wages
held by the employer, (accrued and unpaid) are exempt. Wages paid and/or
deposited are not exempt. Thus, the Smith family effectively has no opportunity to spend earned wages.
Understanding the problems with Wyoming's current wage garnishment exemption statute requires a more careful look at the statute as well
as court interpretation of the statute.' 3 As stated above, the portion of the
statute that grants the exemption is virtually identical to the CCPA statute.,°4
However, the first subsection of the statute contains words that recently led
the Wyoming Supreme Court in Walsh to hold that wages that have been
deposited into a bank account lose their exempt status.0' The relevant portion of the statute reads: "A writ of post judgment garnishment attaching
earnings for personal services shall attach that portion of the defendant's
accrued and unpaid disposable earnings. . . ."" The magic words for the
Walsh court were "accrued" and "unpaid."'0 7
The Walsh majority's discussion and conclusion consisted of a mere
four paragraphs.'
Near the end of the decision, the majority stated, "it may
seem illogical to extend an exemption to a debtor only until such time as he
or she has earnings 'in hand,' it is not this court's job to say that the law
should be something other than it is.""' Thus, the majority appeared to ac101.
102.

See In re Walsh, 96 P.3d 1 (Wyo.2004).
See id. at 2-3.

103.

WYO.STAT. ANN. §1-15-408 (2005).

104. See supra notes 50, 55, and accompanying text for comparison of Wyoming's statute
and the CCPA exemption statute.
105. Wyo. STAT. ANN.§1-15-408(a) (2005); In re Walsh, 96 P.3d 1,2-3 (Wyo.2004).
106.
Wyo. STAT. ANN. §1-15-408(a) (2005) (emphasis added). See supra note 6 for language of the entire subsection.
107.

In re Walsh, 96 P.3d 1, 2-3 (Wyo. 2004).

109.

Id.at 3.
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knowledge the inconsistency between the statute as it was written and the
purpose behind the statute. At the same time, the court is bound to follow
the law as it is written and may not "enlarge, stretch, expand or extend a
The only hope for preventing this inequitable result is for the
statute.""'
court to overrule itself or for the legislature to adopt a new wage garnishment exemption statute."'
B. Similar Cases and Statutes
The Walsh case in Wyoming involved a state wage garnishment exemption statute that was similar to the CCPA exemption statute." 2 There are
other state wage garnishment exemption statutes similar to Wyoming's
where courts have allowed the exemption to survive payment and deposit. It
therefore may be useful to compare Wyoming's wage exemption statute to
those other state wage exemption statutes to understand the difference in
interpretation. Specifically, this analysis will look at statutes and case law
from Colorado, Nevada, and Kansas, states with similar exemption statutes
and case law addressing deposited wages.
First, the Colorado statute defines earnings as "[c]ompensation paid
or payable for personal services."'" 3 Next, the statute provides protection as
follows:
[T]he maximum part of the aggregate disposable earnings of
an individual for any workweek which is subjected to garnishment or levy under execution or attachment may not exceed: (I) ...twenty-five percent of the individual's disposable earnings for that week or the amount by which the individual's disposable earnings for that week exceed thirty
times the federal minimum hourly wage ....4
Colorado's statute, while virtually identical to Wyoming's garnishment exemption statute, contains slight word differences; "compensation
paid or payable" instead of "accrued and unpaid.""' 5 Thus Colorado's statute
allows wage garnishment exemptions to apply to wages that have been paid
(or even deposited) and not just to wages payable or accrued like Wyo-

110.
Id. at 2 (quoting Knowles v. Corkill, 51 P.3d 859, 865 (Wyo. 2002)).
Ill.
See infra note 166 for a proposal of statutory language which could remedy the current Wyoming statute and protected wages that have been deposited in the bank.
Walsh, 96 P.3d at 2.
112.
113.
Compare COL. REV. STAT. §13-54-104(l)(b)(1)(A) (2005) (garnishment applies to
compensation paid or payable), with WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-15-408(a) (2005) (garnishment
applies to accrued and unpaid wages).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol6/iss1/3
114. COL.REV.STAT. §13-54-104(2)(a)(I) (2005).
115.

See supra note 113.
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ming." 6 Courts interpreting the Colorado statute have held that the statute
protects wages that have been deposited, as in the decision of In re Kobernusz." 7 The Kobernusz court emphasized that "wages should not lose [exempt status] solely on the basis of being placed into a bank account.""'
Nevada is another state with a similar wage garnishment exemption
statute and case law that differs from Wyoming's.11 9 Nevada's wage exemption statute reads: "For any pay period, [seventy-five] percent of the disposable earnings of a judgment debtor during that period, or for each week of
the period [thirty] times the minimum hourly wage ...

in effect at the time

the earnings are payable, whichever is greater .... '," The key word in this
statute is "payable."' 21 The use of "payable" makes the Nevada statute simi' 22
lar to Wyoming's statute, which uses synonyms "accrued" and "unpaid.'
Nevada's use of "payable" differs from Colorado's statute that uses "compensation paid or payable" because Nevada's statute appears to apply only to
wages that have not yet been paid." 3 The Norris court held, somewhat contrary to the words of the Nevada statute, that the exemption statute would be
rendered meaningless unless the debtor at least had the chance to deposit and
spend the wages.2 4 A comparison of the Nevada and Wyoming statutes and
the results of Norris and Walsh reveals that perhaps the Norris court was
influenced more by public policy than by a strict reading of the statute.
Kansas is another state with a judicially interpreted CCPA modeled
statute. 5 In re Urban takes a much different view than Walsh. 26 The Kansas statute defines earnings as "compensation paid or payable" (similar to
Colorado) and provides for a maximum garnishment of twenty-five percent
or thirty times the federal minimum wage rate. 2 1 In the Urban case, the
116.
Compare Wyo. STAT. ANN. §1-15-408 (2005) with COL. REV. STAT. §13-54104(1)(b)(I)(A) and COL. REV. STAT. § 13-54-104(2)(a)(I) (2005). See In re Kobernusz, 160

B.R. 844, 847 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1993).
117.

See Kobernusz, 160 B.R. at 847-48.

118. Id.at848.
119. See In re Norris, 203 B.R. 463 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1996); NEV. REV. STAT. §
21.090(1)(g) (2004).
120. NEV. REv. STAT. 21.090()(g) (2004) (emphasis added).
121.
Compare NEV. REV. STAT. 21.090(1)(g) (2004), with WYo. STAT. ANN. §1-15-408
(2005) (comparing Wyoming's use of "accrued" and "unpaid" to Nevada's use of "payable").

122.

See supra note 12 1.

123.
C",noare NEv. REV. STAT. 21.090(1)(g) (2004), with Wyo. STAT. ANN. §1-15-408
(2005), and COL. REV. STAT. § 13-54-104 (2005).
124. In re Norris, 203 B.R. 463, 466 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1996). The court's entire statement

regarding the purpose of the statute: "in order to permit a wage earner to enjoy any benefit
from the protection afforded [by exemption statute], it is necessary to accord the wage earner

a reasonable opportunity to negotiate the 'disposable earnings' and spend the funds, otherwise
the exemption would be rendered meaningless." Id.
125. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-23 10 (2005).
126. See In re Urban, 262 B.R. 865, 870 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2001); see supra notes 90-91 and
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Bankruptcy Court allowed wages that had already been paid and deposited
to remain exempt as long as they could be traced.'28
The Kansas and Colorado statutes contained language different from
Wyoming's statute that specifies the exemption is to be applied to compensation that has been paid.'29 Nevada's statute contained nearly identical language to Wyoming's statute, indicating that the exemption is to be applied
only to accrued and/or payable wages. 30 Nevertheless, case law from Colorado, Nevada, and Kansas allows deposited wages to remain exempt from
garnishment. 3 ' In Urban, Norris, and Kobernusz, the courts looked to the
public policy, as well as the historical treatment of state wage garnishment
exemption statutes, in holding that an exemption should apply to deposited
wages. 32

The Walsh court came to a different conclusion than Urban, Norris,
and Kobernusz when balancing public policy and historical treatment of
wage garnishment exemptions. Despite the paucity of case law in Wyoming
regarding wage garnishment exemptions, there are two significant cases
which demonstrate Wyoming's long history of permitting wage garnishment
exemptions.' 33 First, a Wyoming Supreme Court case from 1903, Lafferty v.
Sistalla, allowed an exemption for wages garnished "when it appeared that
they were necessary for the use of his family."' 34 The statute at issue in
Lafferty had been in place since at least 1899
and evidences Wyoming's
35
history of protecting wages from garnishment.
The wage exemption statute replaced by Wyoming's current version
did not specifically address deposited wages, but arguably was more specific
than the current statute because it expressly protected one-half of the earnings of a debtor earned within sixty days prior to enforcement of the debt. 6
128.
129.

In re Urban, 262 B.R. 865, 870 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2001).
See supra notes 55, 113-116, and accompanying text for discussion of Wyoming and

Colorado statute language. The Kansas statute defines earnings as: "compensation paid or
payable for personal services .. " KAN. STAT. ANN. §60-2310(a)(1), (b) (2005).
130.
Compare WYO. STAT. ANN. §1-15-408 (2005), with NEV. REV. STAT. 21.090(1)(g)

(2004).
131.
See infra note 132.
132.
See generally In re Urban, 262 B.R. 865; In re Norris, 203 B.R. 463 (Bankr. D. Nev.
1996); In re Kobernusz, 160 B.R. 844 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1993).
133.
See Lafferty v. Sistalla, 72 P. 192, 192 (Wyo. 1903); Hancock v. Stockmens Bank &
Trust Co., 739 P.2d 760, 763 (Wyo. 1987).
134.
Lafferty, 72 P. at 192 (referring to exemption of wages garnished at the place of em-

ployment).
135.
For discussion of an early Wyoming exemption statute see supra note 19 and accompanying text.
136. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1- 7-411 (Michie Cum. Supp. 1986) states in relevant portion:

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol6/iss1/3

[Ojne-half of the earnings of the judgment debtor for his personal services
rendered within sixty days immediately preceding the levy of execution
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Hancock v. Stockmens Bank & Trust Co., a Wyoming Supreme Court case
that was decided under the 1986 statute, held that an exemption should be
allowed as long as the person claiming the exemption could provide some
accounting in the form of tracing that the deposited funds came from disposable income. 137 Although this case addressed the burden of establishing an
exemption rather than transformation of exempt funds, the holding evidences
Wyoming's history of favoring exemptions.'3 8
Both the Hancock and Lafferty cases and Wyoming's prior wage
garnishment exemption statute show some history in the State of Wyoming
of favoring exemptions.' 39 Wyoming's history, case law treatment of similar
statutes from other states, and the public policy behind exemptions should
have led the court to decide Walsh differently."' After Walsh, the only way
to remedy the problem is through statutory change or for the Wyoming Supreme Court to overrule itself on this issue."'
The Wyoming Legislature could revise the statute in a number of
ways. First, they could completely rewrite the wage garnishment exemption
statute and replace it. Second, the legislature could simply add specific language to the statute (just a few words would do the trick) that would remedy
the problem with deposited wages.' 4 2 Third, they could approve a separate
exemption on bank accounts that establishes a maximum level of protection
that prevents accumulation of excess wages. Each of these alternatives is
discussed below.

or levy of attachment, and due and owing at the time of the levy, are exempt when it appears by the debtor's affidavit or otherwise that the earnings are necessary for the use of his family residing in this state, supported wholly or in party by his labors.

Id. Compare WYo. STAT. ANN. §1-17-411 (Michie Cum. Supp. 1986), with REV. STAT. WYO.
§ 3951 (1899) (supranote 19), with WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-15-408 (2005) (supranote 55).
137.
Hancock v. Stockmens Bank & Trust Co., 739 P.2d 760, 763 (Wyo. 1987) (dealing
with the exemption on a joint bank account rather than the issue of the changing form of
exempt funds) (interpreting Wyo. STAT. ANN. §1-17-411 (Michie Cum. Supp. 1986)). The
late Chief Justice Larry L. Lehman authored the dissenting opinion in Walsh and used Hancock in opining that the wage garnishment exemption should apply to wages that have been
deposited. In re Walsh, 96 P.3d 1, 6 (Wyo. 2004) (Lehman, J., dissenting). For a discussion
of the theory of tracing see supra note 84.
138. Hancock, 739 P.2d at 760.
139. Id. Lafferty v. Sistalla, 72 P. 192, 192 (Wyo. 1903).
140. See Walsh, 96 P.3d at 2-3. See supra part II(A) of this comment for discussion of the
public policy of wage garnishment exemptions.
141.
Walsh, 96 P.3d at 3 ("[l]t is not this Court's job to say that the law should be something other than it is ... [r]ather, it is this Court's job only to determine legislative intent from
the law as it is.").
Published142.
by Law
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C. More Statutory Approaches.- Examples of Non-CCPA Wage Garnishment Exemption Statutes
The CCPA, which has been a model for most state wage garnishment exemption statutes, was enacted in 1968.141 If the CCPA and state
statutes modeled after it do not provide protection for deposited wages, there
is a strong argument that they do not reflect the realities of our modem society.1" The Florida District Court of Appeals stated:
[In the past], many wage earners received their pay in cash,
bought their necessities with cash, and paid their bills in
cash. In many cases their wages were quickly expended so
that attachment of cash in the hands of a wage earner was
virtually impossible. Today, with direct bank depositing of
wages and our extensive credit system, many wage earners
never see their earnings4 other than as paper transactions
through a bank account. 1
On a similar note, the Supreme Court of Iowa acknowledged:
In order to permit a wage earner to enjoy any benefit from
the protection afforded by [the exemption statute], it is necessary to accord that person a reasonable opportunity to negotiate the paycheck and spend the funds. The commercial
realities of modern-day living will frequently require that
the funds be first deposited in a bank account in order to
achieve that end. If wages intended by law to be exempt
from creditors' claims are only accorded that status in the
hands of the debtor's employer, the protection can be rendered meaningless by creditors levying on the funds6 in the
hands of the debtor or on the debtor's bank account.1
To meet the realities of our modern society, the Wyoming Legislature should abandon the old CCPA-modeled statute and replace the statute
with one that expressly provides for protection of deposited wages.
Several states have promulgated unique wage garnishment exemption statutes that are not modeled on the CCPA' 47 The Wyoming Legislature could use these statutes as an example in replacing the current statute.
For example, the Minnesota wage garnishment exemption statute has several
143.
144.

See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text for discussion of the history of CCPA.

145.

Holmes v. Blazer Fin. Services, 369 So. 2d. 987, 989 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).

146.
Midamerica Say. Bank v. Miehe, 438 N.W.2d 837, 839 (Iowa 1989).
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol6/iss1/3
147.
See generally COLLIER, supra note 7 and Appendix A (providing a discussion on all
state exemption statutes).
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positive attributes that make it a potential model for Wyoming. 4 ' The Minnesota statute provides that earnings subject to garnishment that have been
deposited remain exempt for twenty days following deposit.149 The statute
also identifies a method of tracing that is to be used, specifically the FIFO
method of accounting. 5 ' The relevant portion of the statute reads:
The disposable earnings exempt from garnishment are exempt as a matter of right, whether claimed or not by the person to whom due. The exemptions may not be waived. The
exempt disposable earnings are payable by the employer
when due. The exempt disposable earnings shall also be exempt for 20 days after deposit in any financial institution,
whether in a single or joint account. This 20-day exemption
also applies to any contractual setoff or security interest asserted by a financial institution in which the earnings are
deposited by the individual. In tracing the funds, the first-in
first-out method of accountingshall be used. The burden of
establishing that funds are exempt rests upon the debtor....
151

Under this statute, if John Smith's wages had been deposited within
three weeks prior to garnishment, the wages would remain exempt. This
statute is in harmony with public policy because a person in financial difficulty would likely have family expenses such as a mortgage payment and
groceries, 52 and there is less protection for the stockpiling of funds that have
not been spent and that equitably should belong to a creditor.' 53 Further, the
Minnesota statute expressly provides a method of tracing, which should help
decrease litigation and disputes over which funds are exempt. One potential
weakness in this statute relates to the twenty-day spending period before the
wages lose their exemption. 54 A debtor aware of this provision may be
tempted to "launder" exempt funds by ensuring that he or she spends the
exempt funds, even if on frivolous items, or by later selling items purchased
in the twenty-day period for cash.

148. MINN. STAT. § 550.37(13) (2004).
149. Id. See infra note 151 and accompanying text for discussion and text of Minnesota's
statute.
150.
MINN. STAT. § 550.37(13) (2004). For a discussion of FIFO see supra note 84.
151.
MINN. STAT § 550.37(13) (2004) (emphasis added).
152.
See Elizabeth Warren, The New Economics of the American Family, 12 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 1,34-38 (2004).
153.
See generally Elaine A. Welle, Is It Time For Wyoming to Update It's Fraudulent

Conveyance Laws?, 5 Wyo. L. REV. 207, 216 (2005) (discussing fraudulent conveyance laws
which help protect creditors from debtors' unfair transactions which have the intent to hinder
Publishedcollection).
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North Carolina has taken an approach that calls for discretion by the
court or judge and protects wages earned sixty days prior to garnishment as
long as the court finds that the wages are "necessary for the use of a family
supported wholly or partly by [a debtor's wages]."' 55 The statute reflects
public policy concerns because it addresses actual need and whether a family
depends on the finances of the debtor. On the other hand, it is probably not
the best use of judicial resources to require a court to examine wage garnishment exemptions on a case by case basis.' 56
Iowa also has adopted a unique exemption statute. It provides a
graduated scale of exemption based on the net earnings of the debtor where
the more a debtor earns, the more is available for garnishment.' 5 7 Under the

155.

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-362 (2004), which states in whole:
The court or judge may order any property, whether subject or not to be
sold under execution (except the homestead and personal property exemptions of the judgment debtor), in the hands of the judgment debtor or of
any other person, or due to the judgment debtor, to be applied towards the
satisfaction of the judgment; except that the earnings of the debtor for his
personal services, at any time within 60 days next preceding the order,
cannot be so applied when it appears, by the debtor's affidavit or otherwise, that these earnings are necessary for the use of a family supported
wholly or partly by his labor.

Id.
156.
See generally Christopher S. Strauss, Collateral Damage. How the Supreme Court's
Retroactivity Doctrine affects Federal Drug Prisoners'Apprendi Claims on CollateralReview, 81 N.C. L. REv. 1220, 1253 (2003) (stating that the concept of finality in criminal convictions serves the policy of preserving judicial resources by preventing the need for excessive court appearances).
157.
IOWA CODE § 642.21 (2004) (edited for length) states:
I .... The maximum amount of an employee's earnings which may be

garnished during any one calendar year is two hundred fifty dollars for
each judgment creditor, except ...

when those earnings are reasonably

expected to be in excess of twelve thousand dollars for that calendar year

a. Employees with expected earnings of twelve thousand dollars or more,
but less than sixteen thousand dollars, not more than four hundred dollars
may be garnished.
b. Employees with expected earnings of sixteen thousand dollars or
more, but less than twenty-four thousand dollars, not more than eight
hundred dollars may be garnished.
c. Employees with expected earnings of twenty-four thousand dollars or

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol6/iss1/3
more, but less than thirty-five thousand dollars, not more than one thousand five hundred dollars may be garnished.
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Iowa statute, if John Smith earned less than $12,000 a year, the maximum
amount which could be garnished would be $250 per year per creditor, but if
John was expected to earn more than $50,000 a year, the maximum amount
which could be garnished would be ten percent of his wages."' 8 This statute
reflects public sentiment that the wealthy should not receive as much financial protection as those who make significantly less and who typically find it
harder to meet basic needs.
New York and Oklahoma exemption statutes expressly address the
time period applicable to the exemption. New York's statute grants an exemption for wages earned sixty days before the garnishment. '" Oklahoma
grants the exemption for wages earned ninety days before garnishment."6
These statutes represent practical approaches to limiting the look-back period and would prevent debtors from protecting large savings accounts.
As emphasized earlier in this comment, there are three related ways
that the Wyoming Legislature could revise the wage garnishment exemption
statute.' 61 The first option for Wyoming's Legislature would be to completely replace the current wage garnishment exemption statute, perhaps
with a statute that is not modeled after the CCPA, such as that found in Min62
nesota.

1

A second approach available to Wyoming lawmakers would be to
amend the current statute. The Wyoming Legislature could amend the current statute by adding specific language that would protect deposited
wages. 63 For example, Oregon Revised Statutes § 18.348 provides:
(1) All funds exempt from execution and other process ...
shall remain exempt when deposited in an account of a
judgment debtor as long as the exempt funds are identifiable.

d. Employees with expected earnings of thirty-five thousand dollars or
more, but less than fifty thousand dollars, not more than two thousand

dollars may be garnished.
e. Employees with expected earnings of fifty thousand dollars or more,
not more than ten percent of an employee's expected earnings.

Id.
158.
159.
160.

Id.
N.Y.C.P.L.R. §5205(d) (Consol. 2004).

161.

§ 1171.1(B) (2004).
See supra text paragraph accompanying note 142.

162.

See supra notes 148-154 and accompanying text for discussion of Minnesota statute

OKLA. STAT. tit. 12

and its benefits.
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(2) The provisions of subsection (1) of this section shall not
apply to any accumulationoffunds greaterthan $7,500. "6
This portion of the Oregon statute could be applied to fix the CCPA
language of Wyoming's statute by expressly instructing that deposited exempt funds remain exempt as long as the balance of such an account does
not exceed a specified amount.
In addition, the amendment required to allow the current wage garnishment exemption statute to apply to deposited wages would merely require elimination of the words "accrued" and "unpaid" and substitute words
that grant protection to wages deposited in a bank.'65 This option to slightly
amend the Wyoming statute may meet the least resistance in the legislature
since the addition of only five words would effectively fix the problem. 66
'
The third alternative for remedying the wage garnishment exemption
problem in Wyoming involves a specific exemption on bank accounts which
sets a ceiling on the amount of exempt funds. Incidentally, the Oregon statute presented above also is an example of the third solution because it provides a specific exemption with a limit on the amount allowed to accumulate
in a deposit account.' 67 Similar to the look-back limitation discussed previously, a ceiling on exempt funds in a bank account would prevent the stockpiling of funds which would be inequitable to the creditor seeking payment.
In summary, Wyoming residents may be faced with an inequitable
situation where wages that should be exempt lose their exempt identity if the
wages are deposited in the bank. 168 Public policy and the realities of our
modem society favor a wage garnishment exemption statute that allows deposited wages to remain exempt. 169 The current problem in Wyoming could
be easily remedied by adding just a few words to the statute or by completely replacing the statute with one modeled after another state's wage
garnishment exemption statute. The current Wyoming statute represents a
big problem with an easy fix. The addition of only a few words could pre-

164. OR. REV. STAT. § 18.348 (2004) (emphasis added and edited for content); In re Platt,
270 B.R. 773, 775 (Bankr. D. Ore. 2001) (discussing this statute under its former statute
number, § 23.166 which was re-assigned in 2003).
165.
Compare Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-15-408(a) (2005), with NEv. REV. STAT. 21.090(!)(g)
(2004), and COL. REV. STAT. §13-54-104 (2005).
166. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-15-408(a) (2005) could be amended as follows to remedy the
problem evident in Walsh: ". . . garnishment attaching earnings for personal services shall
attach that portion of the defendant's aWzrued and unpaid disposable earnings [WHETHER
ACCRUED, PAID OR DEPOSITED]...."
167. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
168. In re Walsh, 96 P.3d I (Wyo. 2004).
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol6/iss1/3
169. See supra notes 26-38 and accompanying text for a discussion of public policy regarding wage garnishment exemption statutes.
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vent any further inequitable results as in Walsh. 7 ' Wyoming's current wage
garnishment exemption statute could be replaced or amended with a statute
that is clear, explicit, and grants protection to those who need it, while preventing the sheltering of accumulated wealth. 7 '
V. CONCLUSION

The Wyoming Legislature should adopt a new wage garnishment
exemption statute. The new statute should reflect public policy, namely,
preserving some portion of the debtor's wages so the debtor can provide for
his family and "not become a public charge."'7 To prevent further inequitable rulings, such as in Walsh, the new statute should specifically provide that
recent wages deposited in the bank maintain their exempt status as long as
the funds are traceable as exempt funds derived from wages. The new statute should be explicit and set forth precise rules for tracing, as well as dictate
a window of time when the debtor may spend his wages.
While many of the state wage garnishment exemption statutes discussed in this comment have a number of positive attributes that could be
used to remedy the problem in Wyoming following Walsh, and while the
current Wyoming statute could be remedied with a slight revision, the Minnesota statute is the most complete remedy, addressing all the public policy
issues in one rather short statute. 73 The Wyoming Legislature, should therefore, consider adopting a new wage garnishment exemption statute modeled
after Minnesota's:
The disposable earnings exempt from garnishment are exempt as a matter of right, whether claimed or not by the person to whom due. The exemptions may not be waived. The
exempt disposable earnings are payable by the employer
when due. The exempt disposable earnings shall also be exempt for 20 days after deposit in any financial institution,
whether in a single or joint account. This 20-day exemption
also applies to any contractual setoff or security interest asserted by a financial institution in which the earnings are
deposited by the individual. In tracingthe funds, thefirst-in
first-out method of accountingshall be used. The burden of

170.
See supra note 166.
171.
See MINN. STAT. § 550.37(13).
172.
In re Whalen, 73 B.R. 986,988-89 (C.D. 111.1987); Holmes v. Blazer Fin. Serv., Inc.,
369 So. 2d 987, 990 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (quoting Wolf v. Commander, 188 So. 83, 84
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See supra notes 148-151 for a discussion on the Minnesota Statute.
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establishing that funds are exempt rests upon the debtor....
174

Such a statute mirrors public policy because it allows the debtor to
exempt wages that have been paid prior to garnishment, while at the same
time limiting the debtor's protection to a reasonable amount of time. Under
this approach a debtor may not protect a large amount of prior savings in an
attempt to defraud his creditors.
Such a specific statute also will tend to reduce litigation since the
explicit statutory language leaves little to interpretation. Additionally, a new
statute such as the one proposed above reflects the realities of today's modem society of electronic banking and instant access to information.
If the Wyoming Legislature adopts a statute modeled after Minnesota's, the law would protect our hypothetical Smith family's previously
deposited wages. Only a portion of the deposited wages would be subject to
garnishment, thus allowing John and Jane Smith to provide for their children
and to maintain their household, while contributing toward their financial
obligations and hopefully avoiding bankruptcy and becoming a burden on
state and federal welfare resources.
JASON C. WALKER

APPENDIX A- CHART OF STATE WAGE GARNISHMENT EXEMPTION
STATUTES

Alabama

CCPA style (allowing
garnishment of only 25%
of wages or 30 times federal minimum wage
(FMW) whichever is less).

Ala. Code § 5-19-15, 610-7

Alaska

$350 weekly net earning is

ALASKA STAT. §

exempt, increase to $550

09.38.030, 09.38.050;

for sole support of house-

ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit.

hold

8 §95.030

CCPA style

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 331131

Arizona

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol6/iss1/3
174.
Minn. Stat § 550.37(13) (2004) (emphasis added).
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Arkansas

$25 per week; 60 days
wages exempt if below
maximum

Ark. Code Ann. § 16-66208

California

50% of disposable earnings plus amount withheld
for support

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §
706.050, 706.051, 706.052

Colorado

CCPA style

Col. Rev. Stat. § 13-54104

Connecticut

85% of the first $145 per
week exempt or exempt to
the amount allowed under
the CCPA

Conn.. Gen. Stat. § 18101, 52-362

Delaware

CCPA style, exempt to the
extent of 85% wages for
60 days

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 §
4345; tit. 10 § 4913

District of
Columbia

CCPA style

D.C. Code Ann. § 16-572

Florida

Wages exempt if less than
$500 per week; less protected if greater

Fla. Stat. Ann. § 222.11

Georgia

CCPA style

Ga. Code Ann. § 18-4-20

Hawaii

Scale exemption: 5% of
first $100 monthly income, 10% of next $100,
20% of all > $200

Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 652-1

Idaho

CCPA style

Idaho Code § 11-207

Illinois

CCPA style, 85% exempt
or 45 times FMW

735 I.L.C.S. 5/12-803,
740 I.L.C.S. 170/4

Indiana

No specific exemption for
wages

Iowa

Scale exemption based on
annual earnings, see statutes

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2006
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Kansas

CCPA style

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-2310

Kentucky

CCPA style

Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
427.010(2)

Louisiana

CCPA style

La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
13:3881, § 13:3951

Maine

CCPA style, using 40
times FMW

Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 9A § 5-105

Maryland

CCPA style, 75% exempt;
3 counties using 75% exempt or 30 times FMW

Md. Com. Law Code Ann.
§ 15-601.1

Massachusetts

$125 per week exempt

Mass. Ann. Laws Ch. 246

§ 20
Michigan

Householders with family
may exempt 60% wages,
not less than $15 per
week; without family may
exempt 40% but not less
than $10 per week.

Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §
600.5311

Minnesota

CCPA style, using 40
times FMW and allowing
the exemption for only 20
days post-deposit

Minn. Stat. § 550.37(13)

Mississippi

CCPA style

Miss. Code Ann. § 85-3-4

Missouri

CCPA style, allowing
90% exemption for head
of a family

Mo. Ann. Stat. § 525.030

Montana

CCPA style, less than full
exemption if debtor is not
supporting a family

Mont. Code Ann. § 25-13614

Nebraska

CCPA style, 85% exemption if head of a family

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1558

Nevada

CCPA style

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 21.090

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol6/iss1/3
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N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§
512.21, 161 -C: 11

New
Hampshire

Exempt to the extent of 50
times FMW; differing
exemption amounts for
support orders

New Jersey

No specific wage exemption listed

New Mexico

CCPA style, using 40
times FMW; only 50%
exempt when garnishment
is for child support

N.M. Stat. Ann. § 35-12-7

New York

90% of earnings rendered
60 days before execution;
50% post-execution wages
exempt if supporting
spouse or dependent, 40%
otherwise

N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5205(d),
5241

North Carolina

Exempt to extent needed
for family support

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-362

North Dakota

No specific wage exemption listed

Ohio

CCPA style

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §
2329.66(13)

Oklahoma

CCPA style, 75% of
wages from previous 90
days exempt; 50% postexecution wages exempt if
supporting a spouse or
dependent, 40% otherwise

12 Okla. St. Ann §§
1171.1, 1171.2

Oregon

CCPA style, with a maximum account limit

Or. Rev. Stat. § 18.385

Exempt while held by
employer, 50% exempt for
alimony and child support,
90% exempt for judgment
creditor as a result of resiPublished by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2006
dential lease
Pennsylvania

23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann §
3703; 42 Pa. Cons. Stat.
Ann § 8127
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Rhode Island

No specific wage exemption listed

South Carolina

All personal service earnings exempt in the hands
of the employer

S.C. Code Ann. § 15-39420

South Dakota

CCPA style, 80% exempt
or 40 times FMW, unless
garnished for support of
dependents

S.D. Codified Laws Ann.
§ 21-18-51, 52

Tennessee

CCPA style, exempt except for 25% or 30 times
FMW

Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 262-106, 26-2-108

Texas

Current wages for personal services are exempt
from garnishment except
for child support orders

Tex. Const. art 16 § 28;
1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 20;
Tex. Prop. Code § 42.001

Utah

CCPA style

Utah Code Ann. § 70C-7103

Vermont

CCPA style, 75% or 30
times FMW exempt; 85%
or 40 times FMW exempt
if from a consumer credit
transaction

VT. STAT. ANN. tit 12, §
3170

Virginia

CCPA style

VA. CODE ANN. §§ 34-29,
34-32, 34-33 and 55-165

Washington

CCPA style, 75% or 40
times FMW exempt

Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §
6.27.150

West Virginia

CCPA style, 80% or 30
times FMW exempt

W. Va. Code §§ 38-5A-3,
38-5A-9

Wisconsin

CCPA style

Wis. Stat. Ann. §§
20.921(1), 815.18

Wyoming

CCPA style

Wyo. Stat. § 1-15-408

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol6/iss1/3
Source: 14 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY (15th ed. Rev. 2004)
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